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NONDELEGATION OF MAJOR QUESTIONS 
Clinton T. Summers* 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has many tools at its disposal to address 
improper delegations of legislative power by Congress to the 
executive branch.  Two of these tools are the nondelegation 
doctrine and the major questions doctrine.1  The nondelegation 
doctrine is a sledgehammer.  Able to declare entire statutory 
provisions unconstitutional, its ability to do a lot of damage is 
perhaps the reason the Court never uses it.2  Indeed, the Court has 
only used it twice, both times in 1935.3  Although it’s old and 
rusty, the Court continues to keep it in the toolbox just in case.4  
Since 1935, the Court has been using other, seemingly less 
destructive tools to do similar work.5  As recently pointed out by 
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, the modern major questions 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Arkansas School of Law.  The author would like
to thank Associate Professor Christopher Kelley, University of Arkansas School of Law, for 
his helpful guidance and feedback during the writing process.  The author also thanks 
Matthew Sayer, high school history teacher, for first piquing the author’s interest in law and 
government; his grandparents for their love and encouragement; and his remaining family 
and friends for all their support during law school. 
1. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
2. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that the Court has “almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress 
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or 
applying the law” because the judicial branch is in no better position to decide that question). 
3. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364
(2001). 
4. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (plurality opinion) (announcing in the first sentence
of the opinion that “[t]he nondelegation doctrine bars Congress from transferring its 
legislative power to another branch of Government” but refraining from enforcing the 
doctrine and upholding the delegation at issue).   
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315-16
(2000). 
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doctrine is one of these tools.6  There are, of course, others in the 
toolbox.7   
This Article provides a background of the nondelegation 
doctrine and the major questions doctrine and examines their 
similarities and differences.  It highlights the Court’s latest 
nondelegation case, Gundy v. United States, where an eight-
member Court ultimately upheld the delegation at issue there,8 but 
four Justices clearly would have used the rusty sledgehammer to 
demolish it.9  This Article also notes Justice Kavanaugh’s 
statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Paul v. United 
States, where he responded to Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent 
and likened the nondelegation doctrine to the major questions 
doctrine.10  This Article explores Justice Kavanaugh’s unique 
view of the major questions doctrine.   
Because of the recent surge in interest to revive the 
nondelegation doctrine, and because the Court’s current test for 
measuring delegations has prevented the Court from enforcing the 
doctrine, this Article ultimately proposes that the “major 
questions” test from the major questions doctrine should become 
the new basis for enforcing the nondelegation doctrine.  This 
Article does not seek to explore the many arguments for or against 
the nondelegation doctrine in general.  Decades of scholarship 
exist on the topic.11  Rather, this Article proposes a new test for 
the doctrine in response to these recent developments.   
6. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141-42 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that both the major
questions doctrine and the void-for-vagueness doctrine are two tools the Court uses to rein 
in improper delegations); Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring in the denial of certiorari) (explaining that the major questions doctrine is “closely 
related” to the traditional nondelegation doctrine).   
7. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 5, at 330-35.
8. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (plurality opinion).
9. Justice Gorsuch wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas.  Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but 
likely would have joined the dissent if there would have been another Justice on the Court to 
supply a majority opinion.  See id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).   
10. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
11. For criticism of the doctrine, see, for example, Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002).  For a recent attack 
of the doctrine on historical and originalist grounds, see Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas 
Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3512154.  For a direct response to that article, see Philip Hamburger, 
Delegating or Divesting?, 115 NW. U.L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2020).  For a further glimpse into 
the modern support of the doctrine, see, for example, Ronald A. Cass, Delegation 
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II. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
A. Background
The principle of nondelegation—that Congress may not 
delegate its lawmaking power to others—is rooted in the 
Constitution’s separation of powers and derived from the 
language in Article I.12  That Article begins, “All legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States . . . .”13  As John Locke explained: 
The power of the Legislative being derived from the People 
by a positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other, 
than what that positive Grant conveyed, which being only to 
make Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can 
have no power to transfer their Authority of making Laws, 
and place it in other hands.14 
Therefore, at least in theory, any statute enacted by Congress 
that transfers “legislative power” to another branch violates the 
nondelegation doctrine and shall be declared unconstitutional by 
the courts if challenged.15   
As the plurality in Gundy defined it, “[t]he nondelegation 
doctrine bars Congress from transferring its legislative power to 
another branch of Government.”16  By defining it, the plurality of 
course recognized that the doctrine exists and may be used to 
strike down impermissible delegations.17  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has continually reaffirmed the doctrine’s existence and 
announced its core tenets with confidence.18  Yet the doctrine is 
Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 147 (2017), Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 
327 (2002), and DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1995).   
12. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (plurality opinion).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
14. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government § 141, in JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 363 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) 
(emphasis omitted). 
15. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001).
16. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (“[Article I’s] text permits no delegation of
those [legislative] powers”); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 
85 (1932) (“That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course, clear.”); 
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not actually enforced—at least not literally.19  Congress routinely 
delegates the authority to regulate, and administrative agencies 
today make more rules governing private conduct than Congress 
itself.20  When asked to strike down these delegations as 
unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine, the Supreme 
Court routinely upholds them.21  Enforcing the doctrine, 
therefore, has become a line-drawing exercise between 
constitutional and unconstitutional delegations.  Only twice has 
the Court ever held that a delegation crossed that line of 
constitutionality.22  Both cases were decided in 1935 and involved 
the same New Deal act.23   
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Court struck down a 
provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) that 
granted the President the power to “prohibit” (if he chose) the 
interstate transportation of petroleum in excess of state law 
quotas.24  The Court examined its prior nondelegation cases, all 
of which had upheld delegations on the basis that Congress had 
declared (at a minimum) its general policy before the delegee 
could act.25  In the delegation at hand, the Court concluded that 
Congress “ha[d] declared no policy, ha[d] established no 
standard, [and] ha[d] laid down no rule” by which the President 
was required to follow.26  The statute gave the President complete 
discretion to decide whether interstate transportation of excess 
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot delegate 
legislative power . . . is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and 
maintenance of [our] system of government . . . .”); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825) (“It will not be contended that Congress can delegate . . . powers 
which are strictly and exclusively legislative.”).   
19. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 322 (noting that the “doctrine has had one good year,
and 211 bad ones (and counting)”). 
20. See Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 718, 720-21 (2019).
21. Id. at 725-26.
22. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935). 
23. David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224-25 (1985). 
24. See Panama Ref., 293 U.S. at 406, 430.
25. See id. at 423-30.
26. Id. at 430.
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petroleum should be prohibited27—a decision, the Court held, that 
Congress must make.28   
In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Court 
struck down another section of the NIRA that “authorize[d] the 
President to approve ‘codes of fair competition’” for virtually any 
industry or trade.29  Pursuant to the Act, the President issued an 
executive order and established the “Live Poultry Code,” which 
imposed numerous regulations on the poultry industry in New 
York City, including slaughterhouses like the Schechters’.30  Each 
violation of the code constituted a criminal offense, and the 
Schechters were convicted on eighteen counts in federal court.31  
At the outset of its analysis, the Court recognized that the power 
delegated by this section of the NIRA was significantly more 
broad than the statutory grant in Panama Refining.32  In Panama 
Refining, the authority granted was narrowly defined:  the 
President could decide whether or not to prohibit the interstate 
transportation of excess petroleum.33  Here, the President could 
establish vast codes of regulations that would affect entire 
industries.34  Although the NIRA seemingly limited the 
President’s power to enact codes by providing “condition[s]” of 
approval, these conditions did nothing to limit the President’s 
substantive policy-making discretion.35  The Court found this 
discretion to be “virtually unfettered” and concluded that the 
“code-making authority thus conferred [was] an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power.”36  In his concurrence, Justice 
Cardozo called it “delegation running riot.”37   
In terms of enforcing the nondelegation doctrine, these cases 
have not been followed.38  The “intelligible principle” test 
27. See id. at 406.
28. See id. at 430.
29. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521-22, 551 (1935).
30. Id. at 523-25.
31. Id. at 519.
32. Id. at 530.
33. Id.
34. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541-42.
35. Id. at 538-39.
36. Id. at 542.
37. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
38. See 1 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 138 (6th ed. 2019). 
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eventually became the standard by which all delegations would 
be measured (and upheld).39  As the plurality stated it in Gundy, 
“a statutory delegation is constitutional as long as Congress 
‘lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which 
the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated 
authority] is directed to conform.’”40  Therefore, while legislative 
power theoretically may not be delegated to another branch, the 
Court has upheld nearly every delegation it has faced because it 
has determined that Congress provided an “intelligible principle” 
sufficient to limit the delegated authority.41  Some of the most 
common justifications for allowing Congress to delegate in this 
way include:  (1) Congress’s lack of technical expertise and 
inability to understand the implications of difficult policy 
decisions,42 (2) the idea that executive agencies are politically 
accountable,43 (3) the principle that courts should not substitute 
Congress’s intent to delegate with their own policy judgments,44 
and (4) the general assertion that, in today’s complex society, 
Congress simply cannot do its job without the ability to 
delegate.45 
So, what qualifies as an “intelligible principle”?  The answer 
is pretty much anything.  The Court has found an intelligible 
principle in even the most broad and seemingly limitless 
delegations.46  For example, the Court has upheld delegations that 
grant authority to make decisions that are “generally fair and 
39. See Cary Coglianese, Dimensions of Delegation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1857
(2019). 
40. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (brackets in original)
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)). 
41. See Coglianese, supra note 39, at 1855-57.  It’s important to note, however, that
some scholars have argued that authority conferred to the executive branch by statute is not 
a delegation of legislative power at all.  Rather, Congress exercises its legislative power when 
it confers the power, and the executive branch exercises “executive” power when it acts in 
accordance with the statutory grant.  See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1723.   
42. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 38, at 150.
43. See id. at 152-54.
44. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (“[W]e
have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree 
of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’”) (citations 
omitted).   
45. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
46. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 11, at 167-68.
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equitable”47 and in the “public interest.”48  Many scholars have 
recognized, I think rightly, that these kinds of standards are 
meaningless.49  Consequently, these standards give agencies and 
other bodies vast discretion to make generally applicable rules 
that regulate private conduct and society as a whole.50   
It is worth noting, however, that the “intelligible principle” 
language comes from J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United 
States,51 a case decided in 1928, seven years before Panama 
Refining and Schechter Poultry.  Yet, in those cases, the Court did 
not rely on the so-called “test” to strike down the delegations as 
unconstitutional.  Panama Refining only referred to the phrase in 
passing when discussing J.W. Hampton but did not rely on the 
phrase for its holding.52  Schechter Poultry never mentioned 
“intelligible principle” at all.53  As Justice Gorsuch pointed out, 
“the phrase sat more or less silently entombed until the late 
1940s” when “lawyers beg[a]n digging it up in earnest . . . .”54  
The intelligible principle test, however, remains the primary test 
used by the courts today.55 
B. Gundy and SORNA
In the Supreme Court’s latest nondelegation case, Gundy v. 
United States, a four-Justice plurality declared the particular 
delegation at issue one that “easily passes constitutional muster” 
47. E.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944).
48. E.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
49. See, e.g, HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 38, at 133; Cass, supra note 11, at 167-
70; Lawson, supra note 11, at 328-29; see also WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG 
MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 217 (1974) (Justice Douglas opining in his autobiography that 
“‘[p]ublic interest’ is too vague a standard to be left to free-wheeling administrators.”).   
50. Cf. Gordon, supra note 20, at 720-21, 724.
51. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
52. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429-30 (1935).
53. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541 (1935)
(discussing J.W. Hampton but not quoting its “intelligible principle” language). 
54. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
55. Compare id. at 2123 (plurality opinion) (affirming the “intelligible principle”
standard as the primary test), with id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing 
with the plurality that the delegation at issue passes the “approach [the] Court has taken for 
many years” but suggesting a readiness to abandon that approach if a majority of the Court 
were willing to do so).   
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under the intelligible principle approach.56  Justice Alito curiously 
agreed but concurred only in the judgment because he would 
“reconsider the approach [the Court] ha[s] taken for the past 84 
years.”57  He did not join the dissent, however, because “a 
majority is not willing to do that, [and] it would be freakish to 
single out the provision at issue here for special treatment.”58  
Critical to Alito’s decision, Justice Kavanaugh was not on the 
Court when Gundy was argued and thus did not participate in the 
outcome to supply a majority opinion one way or the other.59   
Justice Gorsuch wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Thomas, and disagreed with the plurality’s 
interpretation of the statute.60  More importantly, Gorsuch 
asserted that the “intelligible principle” test for measuring 
delegations “has no basis in the original meaning of the 
Constitution, in history, or even in the decision from which it was 
plucked”61 and argued that it should be abandoned in favor of 
more traditional principles.62  Thus, four Justices expressed 
interest in reviving the nondelegation doctrine (counting Justice 
Alito).  That is significant.  The last time even two Justices 
advocated in a single case for enforcing the nondelegation 
doctrine was in 1981.63 
Gundy involved a provision of the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act (SORNA).64  Passed in 2006, the Act created 
a nationwide system of mandatory registration for those convicted 
of sex offenses.65  The Act’s registration requirements thus clearly 
applied to all future sex offenders.66  But for those convicted of 
56. Id. at 2121 (plurality opinion).  Justice Kagan wrote for the plurality, joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. 
57. Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
58. Id.
59. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2120.  In fact, Justice Kavanaugh was confirmed by the Senate
only four days after Gundy was argued.  See Petition for Rehearing, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 
(No. 17-6086), 2019 WL 3202508, at *1-2.   
60. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2145-48 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 2139.
62. See id. at 2136-41.
63. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-44
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.). 
64. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (plurality opinion); 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2006).
65. See 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901, 20911-13.
66. See 34 U.S.C. § 20913(b).
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sex offenses before SORNA’s enactment, Congress granted to the 
Attorney General “the authority to specify the applicability of the 
[Act’s] requirements . . . and to prescribe rules for the registration 
of any such sex offenders.”67   
Petitioner Herman Gundy, a pre-Act sex offender, was 
convicted for failing to register under SORNA, a crime 
punishable by fine, imprisonment up to ten years, or both.68  
Gundy challenged that conviction under the nondelegation 
doctrine, arguing that Congress impermissibly delegated 
legislative power to the Attorney General by allowing the 
Attorney General to specify SORNA’s applicability to pre-Act 
offenders.69  The four-Justice plurality, along with the help of 
Justice Alito’s concurrence in the judgment, upheld the 
delegation as constitutional because the Act contained an 
“intelligible principle” that sufficiently limited the Attorney 
General’s authority.70   
In the plurality’s view, “Congress had made clear in 
SORNA’s text that the new registration requirements would apply 
to pre-Act offenders.”71  Although Congress did not state it 
explicitly in the text, the plurality construed SORNA to require 
the Attorney General to apply SORNA’s registration 
requirements to pre-Act offenders “as soon as feasible.”72  The 
plurality discovered this intelligible principle after doing some 
statutory interpretation, looking to the Act’s stated purpose, its 
definition of “sex offender,” and its legislative history.73  
Although it may seem unusual for the plurality to infer a standard 
that the Act never explicitly stated, the Court has previously 
construed statutes to find similar standards.74  The dissent, 
67. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).
68. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122; see 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2016).
69. Brief for Petitioner, at 23-24, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086).
70. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129-30.
71. Id. at 2125.
72. Id. at 2121.
73. See id. at 2123, 2126-29.
74. The plurality pointed to Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001)
and Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104-05 (1946) as two examples.  Gundy, 
139 S. Ct. at 2123.  Even Justice Rehnquist looked to legislative history and statutory context 
in the “Benzene case” in his attempt to ascertain a more definite standard beyond the 
explicitly stated feasibility standard there.  See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst. (The 
Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 675-82 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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however, took issue with the plurality’s interpretation because the 
“feasibility” standard was nowhere to be found in SORNA’s 
text.75  Justice Gorsuch said it was a figment of the government’s 
(and the plurality’s) imagination.76  But even if the statute 
contained such a limitation, Gorsuch argued, it still left the 
Attorney General “free to make all the important policy 
decisions” regarding how SORNA applied to pre-Act offenders.77 
The first line of the dissent explains Gorsuch’s general 
argument:  “The Constitution promises that only the people’s 
elected representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting 
liberty.”78  He expanded that argument and stressed the idea that, 
at a minimum, Congress may not delegate to others its power to 
make rules that restrict the people’s liberty.79  Notwithstanding 
that general principle, Gorsuch looked to caselaw and outlined 
three ways in which Congress may permissibly delegate its power 
to regulate:  (1) when Congress makes the policy decisions but 
authorizes another branch to “fill up the details”;80 (2) when 
Congress makes the application of its pre-decided rule 
conditioned on executive fact-finding;81 and (3) when Congress 
assigns authority to another branch that the Constitution already 
vests in that other branch.82   
Gorsuch argued that when Justice Taft first wrote of an 
“intelligible principle” in J.W. Hampton, he only used the phrase 
to explain the operation of the traditional tests as used in prior 
cases, not alter their analysis.83  The simple “remark” eventually 
“[took] on a life of its own” when lawyers began arguing that the 
broad phrase displaced the Court’s traditional tests.84  For decades 
now, the Court has been using the intelligible principle “test” as 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has regularly construed ambiguous statutes in a way that 
avoids serious constitutional questions.  See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).   
75. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2145-46 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2145.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2131.
79. See id. at 2131, 2133-34.
80. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2137.
83. Id. at 2139.
84. Id.
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the primary way to measure delegations.85  Gorsuch explained, 
however, that some of the Court’s decisions under the intelligible 
principle test are likely consistent with the more traditional tests.86  
Gorsuch then went on to apply the traditional tests to 
SORNA.87  While admitting that what qualifies as mere “details” 
under the first test can be “difficult to discern,” Gorsuch found it 
“hard to see how SORNA leaves the Attorney General with only 
details to fill up” when it gives him the discretion “to impose on 
500,000 pre-Act offenders all of the statute’s requirements, some 
of them, or none of them.”88  Nor was the Attorney General’s 
discretion as to pre-Act offenders conditioned on executive fact-
finding.89  Although Congress could have conditioned the Act’s 
applicability to pre-Act offenders on a finding such as “offenders 
who [] present an ‘imminent hazard to the public safety,’” 
Congress did no such thing.90  SORNA “gave the Attorney 
General unfettered discretion to decide which requirements to 
impose on which pre-Act offenders.”91  Lastly, SORNA did not 
assign authority that the executive branch already enjoyed 
discretion over.92  Instead, it gave the nation’s chief prosecutor 
the authority to write his own “criminal code” regarding sex 
offenders who fail to register—”a quintessentially legislative 
power,” Gorsuch asserted.93   
“In the end,” Gorsuch argued, “there isn’t a single policy 
decision concerning pre-Act offenders on which Congress even 
tried to speak,”94 and SORNA vested legislative power in the 
Attorney General—a violation of the separation of powers and the 
nondelegation doctrine.95  While Gorsuch advocated for 
enforcing the nondelegation doctrine under traditional principles, 
85. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785
(1948).
86. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2140 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 2143.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991)).
91. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2143-44.
93. See id. at 2144.
94. Id. at 2143.
95. See id. at 2144-45.
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he recognized that the Court has been using other doctrines to 
“rein in Congress’s efforts to delegate legislative power,” one of 
which is the major questions doctrine.96   
C. Justice Kavanaugh’s Paul Statement
In a statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Paul v. 
United States,97 Justice Kavanaugh praised Gorsuch’s Gundy 
opinion but interpreted it in a way that likened the traditional 
nondelegation doctrine to the modern major questions doctrine:  
I agree with the denial of certiorari because this case 
ultimately raises the same statutory interpretation issue that 
the Court resolved last Term in [Gundy].  I write separately 
because Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the 
Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent 
may warrant further consideration in future cases.  Justice 
Gorsuch’s opinion built on views expressed by then-Justice 
Rehnquist some 40 years ago in [the Benzene case].  In that 
case, Justice Rehnquist opined that major national policy 
decisions must be made by Congress and the President in the 
legislative process, not delegated by Congress to the 
Executive Branch. 
In the wake of Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, the Court has not 
adopted a nondelegation principle for major questions.  But 
the Court has applied a closely related statutory 
interpretation doctrine . . . . 
. . . . 
Like Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 40 years ago, Justice 
Gorsuch’s thoughtful Gundy opinion raised important points 
that may warrant further consideration in future cases.98 
More on then-Justice Rehnquist’s Benzene opinion later.99  
The day the Court denied certiorari in Paul, the Court denied 
a petition to rehear Gundy with a full panel of nine.100  Kavanaugh 
did not participate in the decision to rehear Gundy and thus may 
96. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
97. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the
denial of certiorari).  The Paul case essentially presented the same issue as Gundy.  See id.  
98. Id.
99. See infra Part IV.A.
100. Gundy v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 579, 579 (2019) (mem.) (reh’g denied).
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or may not have wanted to retry the case, but he clearly indicated 
his interest in reviving and enforcing the nondelegation doctrine 
in his Paul statement issued the same day.101  But perhaps he 
would go about it in a different way than Justice Gorsuch and 
would incorporate the principles of the major questions doctrine.  
Before that analysis, first a brief background on the major 
questions doctrine as we know it.   
III. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE
A. Background
The major questions doctrine is a relatively new tool.102  If 
the nondelegation doctrine is a sledgehammer, the major 
questions doctrine might be a kitchen utility knife, a tool used to 
cut the excess fat off of an agency-fattened statute.  While the 
nondelegation doctrine would strike down the statute itself, the 
major questions doctrine would strike down an agency’s rule 
interpreting the statute.103  Technically speaking, therefore, the 
two doctrines do not do the same work.   
To state the major questions doctrine in one sentence:  courts 
will not defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute when doing so would grant the agency power 
to decide a question of major economic and political 
significance.104  The doctrine has traditionally been viewed as an 
exception to the revolutionary “Chevron deference.”105 
The Chevron case106 announced a two-step process that 
courts generally follow when analyzing an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute.107  At step one, a court will ask 
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue” and/or whether the statute is “silent or ambiguous” on the 
101. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
102. See Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The
Resurgent “Major Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 358 (2016) (noting the 
doctrine’s “creation” in the 1990s, post-Chevron).   
103. Cf. id. at 396.
104. See, e.g., Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).
105. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015); Joshua S. Sellers, ”Major
Questions” Moderation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 930, 939 (2019). 
106. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
107. E.g., King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488.
96 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:1 
topic.108  If the statute is silent or ambiguous and Congress has 
not otherwise directly spoken to the issue, the court will defer to 
the agency’s interpretation so long as it is a “reasonable” one (step 
two).109  “In extraordinary cases,” however, a court will not 
follow that analysis if the ambiguity involves a question of “deep 
‘economic and political significance.’”110  Instead, the court will 
simply interpret the statute itself, rather than defer to the agency’s 
interpretation.111  Chevron is premised on the theory that 
Congress implicitly delegates to agencies the authority to clarify 
ordinary ambiguities.112  But courts will hesitate before 
concluding that Congress intended such an implicit delegation 
when the ambiguity involves a question of major economic and 
political significance.113 
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) had interpreted its authority to 
regulate “drugs” and “devices” to include cigarettes and other 
tobacco products.114  Under Chevron step one, the Court went 
beyond textual ambiguity and looked extensively to Congress’s 
tobacco-specific legislation passed subsequent to the FDA’s 
creation.115  By placing the FDA’s authority in that context, the 
Court determined that Congress had in fact “directly spoken to 
the question at issue and precluded the FDA from regulating 
tobacco products.”116  Therefore, the analysis essentially ended at 
Chevron step one, and the FDA simply could not regulate tobacco 
products without clear authorization by Congress.117  The Court 
clearly noted, however, that the inquiry under Chevron step one 
may be influenced by the significant “economic and political” 
nature of the regulatory issue.118  Regarding the FDA’s regulation 
of tobacco products, the Court was “confident that Congress 
108. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
109. See id. at 843-45.
110. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
111. See id. at 2489.
112. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 126-27.
115. See id. at 143-56.
116. Id. at 160-61.
117. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160-61.
118. See id. at 159-60.
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could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic 
and political significance . . . .”119  Thus, the case was essentially 
a Chevron case that ended at the ambiguity step, but the Court 
provided an alternative basis for its holding under what has since 
been known as the major questions doctrine.120 
The Court again invoked the major questions doctrine in 
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.121  The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) had decided to expand its power to 
regulate greenhouse gasses of motor vehicles to include the 
regulation of millions of stationary sources.122  The Court seemed 
to skip Chevron’s analysis altogether and go straight to attacking 
the EPA’s interpretation on major questions grounds.123  The 
Court held that the EPA’s interpretation was “unreasonable 
because it would bring about an enormous and transformative 
expansion” by asserting its authority to regulate “a significant 
portion of the American economy” without clear congressional 
authorization.124  The Court also found significant the EPA’s 
previous admissions that it did not have the very authority it 
claimed to now have.125  Because the EPA’s decision to expand 
its authority was one of “vast ‘economic and political 
significance,’” the rule was deemed “invalid” until Congress 
clearly addressed the matter.126   
In King v. Burwell, the Court solidified the major questions 
doctrine as independent from Chevron’s analysis.127  The case 
involved the question of whether the Affordable Care Act’s tax 
119. Id. at 160.
120. See Richardson, supra note 102, at 366, 370.
121. Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
122. See id. at 307, 324.
123. See id. at 324.
124. Id. (citing Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).
125. Id.
126. See Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 324, 333.
127. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015); see also, e.g., Richardson,
supra note 102, at 379-80.  But cf. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 421 n.2 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining that 
King was “somewhat different” from the typical major questions case because the statutory 
provision involved “major” tax credits, not regulation of “major” private activity); Mila 
Sohoni, King’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1432 (2018) (noting that King 
involved large spending by the federal government rather than by private parties and arguing 
that King’s invocation of the major questions doctrine independent of Chevron should only 
apply in cases with similar circumstances). 
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credits were available in states that had a federal-run exchange.128  
At the outset of the Court’s analysis, it declared that it would not 
defer to the agency’s arguably reasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute.129  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 
Court, determined that this was one of those “extraordinary cases” 
that involved a question of “deep ‘economic and political 
significance’” because it would involve billions of dollars of tax 
credits and would affect the price of health insurance for millions 
of people.130  Denying Chevron deference, the Court then 
proceeded to interpret the statute itself.131  The Court ultimately 
concluded that the agency’s interpretation was the proper one 
after all.132 
B. Justice Kavanaugh’s Approach
Before taking the bench at the Supreme Court, Justice 
Kavanaugh wrote an instructive opinion on his view of the major 
questions doctrine as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit.133  In U.S. Telecom Association v. FCC, then-Judge
Kavanaugh outlined what he calls the major “rules” doctrine.134
In Kavanaugh’s view, such a doctrine already exists under the
Supreme Court’s precedents—it’s the major questions doctrine,
but it goes beyond simply saying that Chevron won’t apply.135
Kavanaugh’s version presumes agency rules of major economic
and political significance to be unlawful unless Congress has
clearly authorized the agency to issue such a rule.136
128. See King, 35 S. Ct. at 2485.
129. See id. at 2488-89.
130. Id. (internal citations omitted).
131. See id.
132. See id. at 2496.
133. See generally U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 417-35 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
134. See generally id.  For more on Kavanaugh’s “novel” doctrine, see Michael
Sebring, The Major Rules Doctrine: How Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s Novel Doctrine Can 
Bridge the Gap Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 189 (2018). 
135. See U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 426 n.7 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc). 
136. Id. at 421; Sebring, supra note 134, at 206, 212.
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The issue in U.S. Telecom was the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC)’s 2015 net neutrality rule, which classified 
broadband internet as a “telecommunications service” rather than 
an “information service,” thus subjecting internet service 
providers to the stringent regulations of common carriers under 
the Communications Act.137  Dissenting from the denial to rehear 
the case en banc, Justice Kavanaugh took the opportunity to 
explain that, because the FCC’s net neutrality rule was (1) a major 
rule and (2) not clearly authorized by Congress, the net neutrality 
rule should be declared unlawful.138  As support, Kavanaugh cited 
the usual major questions cases, except, most notably, King v. 
Burwell.139   
Kavanaugh relegated King to a footnote where he claimed 
that the Court applied a “form” of the major “rules” doctrine when 
it simply denied Chevron deference and reviewed the agency’s 
interpretation de novo (ultimately siding with the agency).140  
This is the precise reason why Kavanaugh’s major rules doctrine 
differs from the Supreme Court’s major questions doctrine:  If the 
Court in King had followed Kavanaugh’s formulation, it would 
have declared the agency’s interpretive rule unlawful after 
determining that it was a major rule,141 assuming Congress had 
not clearly mandated such an interpretation.142  Of course, the 
Court denied Chevron deference instead, engaged in a de novo 
review of the proper interpretation, and ultimately upheld the 
agency’s interpretation as the best interpretation.143  Therefore, 
Kavanaugh was only left to rely on those major questions cases 
where the Supreme Court actually struck down the agency’s 
137. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
138. U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 422-26 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). 
139. Id. at 420-21.
140. Id. at 421 n.2.
141. Id. at 421.
142. In fact, the Court clearly implied that Congress had not authorized the agency’s
decision when it said, “[H]ad Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely 
would have done so expressly.”  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal 
citations omitted).  The Court also explicitly said, albeit a little later in the opinion, that the 
relevant section’s language was “ambiguous.”  Id. at 2491. 
143. See id. at 2489-96.
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rule.144  Of those cases, Utility Air provides the clearest support 
for Kavanaugh’s major rules doctrine by requiring “clear 
congressional authorization” for an agency to claim regulatory 
authority over a decision of “vast ‘economic and political 
significance.’”145 
Kavanaugh maintained that “an ambiguous grant of statutory 
authority is not enough” for an agency to claim regulatory 
authority over a major issue (unlike Chevron deference, where it 
is usually enough).146  But if any confusion existed before as to 
what Kavanaugh’s doctrine requires,147 Kavanaugh provided a 
succinct statement of his take on the major questions doctrine in 
his Paul statement: 
In order for an executive or independent agency to exercise 
regulatory authority over a major policy question of great 
economic and political importance, Congress must either: (i) 
expressly and specifically decide the major policy question 
144. See U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 420-21 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc). 
145. Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (citations omitted).
However, in that case, two other factors proved significant in the Court’s decision:  the EPA’s 
previous admissions that it did not have the authority it granted to itself, see id., and the 
EPA’s “tailoring” or “rewriting” of the statute’s un-ambiguous terms to make its 
interpretation more reasonable, see id. at 325, 328.   
146. U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 421 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). 
147. Judge Srinivasan, in his concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc, stressed
the important point that there are “two distinct species of ambiguity”:  (1) ambiguity about 
whether the statute itself clearly mandates a particular rule and (2) ambiguity about whether 
the statute clearly authorizes an agency to issue that rule.  Id. at 386 (Srinivasan, J., 
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).  Srinivasan claimed that Kavanaugh wrongly 
conflated the two.  Id.  Indeed, it is confusing.  But Srinivasan confused things even further 
when he restated the second species as an ambiguity that seems even broader:  ambiguity 
about whether the statute clearly authorizes an agency to “resolve the question,” perhaps 
between a couple alternatives (which seems to have been the case here).  Id. at 387.  Rather 
than address the differences between the [potentially three] species, Kavanaugh responded 
by saying that he could not find any statutory language that “clearly classifies ISPs as 
telecommunications providers” or “clearly authorizes the agency to classify ISPs as 
telecommunications providers.”  Id. at 426 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc) (emphasis added).  Therefore, in his view, the statute was ambiguous in 
terms of the first two species.  Srinivasan, however, asserted that the Supreme Court (in its 
Brand X opinion) had already determined that the statute clearly authorized “the FCC [] to 
answer [the] question.”  Id. at 387 (Srinivasan, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en 
banc).  Both Kavanaugh and Judge Brown disputed this line of argument.  Id. at 426 n.6 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); see also id. at 403 (Brown, 
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).   
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itself and delegate to the agency the authority to regulate and 
enforce; or (ii) expressly and specifically delegate to the 
agency the authority both to decide the major policy question 
and to regulate and enforce.148 
In other words, Kavanaugh would uphold an agency’s major 
rule so long as Congress has either clearly authorized the rule 
itself or clearly delegated the authority to decide the rule.149  
However, Kavanaugh now defines “clear” congressional 
authorization (from U.S. Telecom) to mean “express[] and 
specific[]” congressional authorization, which is a more definite 
and harder standard to prove.150 
What is most interesting about Kavanaugh’s Paul statement 
is that it is written in the context of the nondelegation doctrine, 
not the major questions doctrine.  The statement was left very 
open-ended, simply expressing that Gorsuch’s Gundy opinion 
“raised important points that may warrant further consideration in 
future cases.”151  Presumably, however, if Kavanaugh is willing 
to uphold major agency rules that are expressly delegated by 
Congress, he is also willing to uphold the statutory delegations 
themselves.  But that may not be the case, given that Kavanaugh 
praised Gorsuch’s opinion, which “built on views expressed by 
then-Justice Rehnquist”—who argued for nondelegation of major 
questions!152  It seems odd to want it both ways.  Justice Gorsuch, 
however, would almost certainly not permit delegations of 
authority to decide major questions, as Kavanaugh himself 
recognized.153  
IV. NONDELEGATION OF MAJOR QUESTIONS
Judges and commentators alike have noted the similarities
between the traditional nondelegation doctrine and the modern 
148. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
149. See id.
150. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring in the denial of certiorari). 
151. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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major questions doctrine.154  But do they actually do the same 
work as Justice Gorsuch seemed to suggest?  Technically 
speaking, no.  The major questions doctrine can be used to 
invalidate agency rules while the nondelegation doctrine can be 
used to invalidate statutes.155  But they do share one major 
similarity:  they both operate to limit the policymaking power of 
executive and independent agencies.156  In so doing, proponents 
of both doctrines also have the goal of limiting Chevron’s 
reach.157   
One disadvantage of the major questions doctrine, however, 
is that courts may be required to use it time and time again to 
invalidate major agency rules that all stem from the same 
statutory delegation of authority.  It invites agencies to try again 
and thus creates the possibility for constant litigation in the courts.  
The nondelegation doctrine kills the problem at the source by 
invalidating the delegation itself, thereby preventing future major 
rules from being issued without clear congressional 
154. See, e.g., id.; Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141-42 (2019) (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting); Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1181, 1198-1203 (2018); Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: 
On the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 
2043-48 (2018); Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 
ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 60-63 (2010) (referring to the major questions doctrine as the “elephants-
in-mouseholes doctrine”).   
155. Cf., e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception
to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got 
it Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 617-18 (2008) (discussing how the nondelegation 
doctrine, unlike the major questions doctrine, constrains Congress rather than executive 
agencies).   
156. While both doctrines have the effect of invalidating an agency’s rule interpreting
a statute, the nondelegation doctrine goes a step further by invalidating the statute itself.  Cf. 
id.   
157. In fact, while on the Tenth Circuit, then-Judge Gorsuch invoked Marbury v.
Madison to argue for the total elimination of Chevron.  See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 
F.3d 1142, 1151-58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  Justice Kavanaugh has
argued to skip Chevron’s ambiguity step (step one) and go straight to interpreting the
statutory text instead.  See Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Role of the Judiciary in Maintaining the
Separation of Powers, Lecture Before The Heritage Foundation (Oct. 25, 2017) (transcript
available at [https://perma.cc/WZ38-4RMV]).  But even that would seem to render Chevron
meaningless.  There would be no need for step two, because a court would always choose its
interpretation over the agency’s, even if the agency’s interpretation was a “reasonable” one.
Notwithstanding, Kavanaugh would still “defer to agencies in cases involving statutes using
broad and open-ended terms” such as “reasonable, appropriate, feasible, or practicable.”  Id.
(internal quotes omitted).
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authorization.158  For example, if the major questions doctrine had 
been around when Schechter Poultry was decided, it may have 
been used to invalidate the Live Poultry Code because the Court 
would have considered it to be a decision of major economic and 
political significance.159  But the President could have continued 
to establish other wide-ranging codes of regulation with an even 
greater scope than the Live Poultry Code, and the courts would 
be called on to invalidate those as well.160   
There must be a tool the courts can use in the rarest of 
circumstances to enforce the separation of powers and the 
promise of the Constitution that the most important policy 
decisions (at a minimum) are made only one way:  by passage of 
a bicameral legislature with presentment to the President.161  To 
be sure, that tool is supposed to already exist—the nondelegation 
doctrine.  And, in fact, it was used in Schechter Poultry and 
Panama Refining.162  But as it sits now, Congress can delegate 
away massive swaths of policymaking authority so long as it 
provides an “intelligible principle” to guide the delegee’s hand 
(which has proven to mean almost anything).163  Instead of 
limiting the nature or subject matter of delegations, the 
intelligible principle approach is only capable of limiting the 
degree of discretion within such delegated authority—and it 
evidently allows a lot of discretion.164 
Clearly there is an appetite for some sort of revival of the 
nondelegation doctrine.  If the longstanding “intelligible 
principle” test for measuring delegations is now disfavored, what 
should the test be?  Just within the last decade, the major questions 
doctrine has found secure footing in the Supreme Court thanks to 
Utility Air and King.165  Is it possible to transfer this “major 
158. Cf. Moncrieff, supra note 155, at 618.
159. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935). 
160. See id.
161. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; cf. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 945-51 (1983). 
162. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541-42; Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
430 (1935). 
163. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (plurality opinion).
164. See Cass, supra note 11, at 183-84.
165. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015); Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). 
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questions” idea to the nondelegation doctrine?  Does the rationale 
behind the major questions doctrine—that Congress does not 
implicitly delegate major questions—provide support to those 
who argue for a revival of the nondelegation doctrine but 
simultaneously loathe the intelligible principle approach?  This 
Article attempts to answer those questions in the affirmative.   
Michael Sebring has argued for simply implementing Justice 
Kavanaugh’s major rules doctrine with the caveat that there 
should be a presumption against finding a “major rule.”166  This 
may well be a “compromise solution . . . between proponents of a 
fully enforced nondelegation doctrine[] and those who view the 
administrative state as serving a necessary function in a modern, 
complex governmental regulatory regime.”167  However, as 
Sebring rightly admits, this will likely not satisfy those who 
advocate for an enforceable nondelegation doctrine because it still 
allows Congress to “delegate resolution of major political issues, 
so long [as] Congress does so through a clear statement.”168  
Therefore, a revised version of the nondelegation doctrine would 
be preferred if possible, all while retaining the existing major 
questions doctrine as another tool in the toolbox.   
Another proposal that falls short is Professor David 
Schoenbrod’s new approach.169  While recognizing the 
impediments to enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine (or as 
Schoenbrod calls it, the “consent-of-the-governed norm”),170 
Schoenbrod has suggested a complex half-measure in which the 
Court would first call upon Congress to approve any new and 
significant regulations tending to violate the consent-of-the-
governed norm.171  “If Congress does not respond to the call” by 
a certain date, the Court would then strike down the regulation if 
it would affect the annual economy by $100 million or more.172  
Although Schoenbrod claims that this test would replace the 
“intelligible principle” test commonly associated with the 
166. See Sebring, supra note 134, at 191, 225-26.
167. Id. at 249.
168. Id. at 246 (emphasis omitted).
169. See generally David Schoenbrod, Consent of the Governed: A Constitutional
Norm that the Court Should Substantially Enforce, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213 (2020). 
170. Id. at 216, 254-55.
171. See id. at 257-58.
172. See id. at 258-59.
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nondelegation doctrine, his approach would only strike down the 
regulations themselves rather than the statutes that delegate their 
authority.173 
A. Justice Rehnquist and the Benzene Case
As Justice Kavanaugh noted, the Supreme Court has not yet 
recognized an affirmative judicial doctrine that would declare 
statutory delegations of “major questions” unconstitutional.174  
But at least one Justice since the dawn of the intelligible principle 
approach has argued for a version of it.  In the Benzene case, 
Justice Rehnquist would have declared unconstitutional a 
provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Act because it 
delegated to the Secretary of Labor the authority to make an 
“important choice[] of social policy.”175  Chief Justice Burger 
agreed with Justice Rehnquist’s arguments just one year later in a 
similar case.176 
In the Benzene case, section 6(b)(5) of the Act allowed the 
Secretary to promulgate regulations of toxic materials and other 
harmful substances “which most adequately assure[], to the extent 
feasible, [and] on the basis of the best available evidence, that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional 
capacity . . . .”177  This gave the Secretary the power to set the 
lawful minimum level of exposure to harmful substances (in this 
case benzene) in workplaces nationwide.178  The way in which the 
Secretary was to determine the appropriate level, however, was 
not clearly spelled out in the Act.179  Setting the level would 
173. See id. at 262-63.
174. See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the
denial of certiorari). 
175. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S.
607, 685-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).  Additionally, Justice 
Rehnquist believed that the provision at issue failed to provide an intelligible principle 
sufficient to guide the Secretary’s discretion.  See id. at 685-86.  Justice Rehnquist would 
have required challenged delegations to pass both inquiries.  See id.  
176. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.). 
177. The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 612 (plurality opinion) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
655(b)(5) (1970)). 
178. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5).
179. Cf. The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 612-14 (plurality opinion).
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naturally require a balancing of the statistical risks for health 
complications or potential death with the economic costs to be 
borne by employers in preventing those risks.180  The decision of 
how to strike that balance (or even whether to engage in a 
balancing), Justice Rehnquist argued, was “quintessentially one 
of legislative policy.”181  And because he would classify it as a 
“difficult,” “important,” “critical,” and “fundamental” policy 
decision (seemingly using those terms interchangeably),182 
Justice Rehnquist would have invalidated the relevant portion of 
section 6(b)(5) of the Act as an unconstitutional delegation.183 
Although he did not express it in the same way, Justice 
Rehnquist would likely have regarded the Secretary’s decision as 
one of “deep ‘economic and political significance,’” to use the 
language of the modern major questions doctrine.184  The 
Secretary’s proposed rule would have involved hundreds of 
millions of dollars in compliance costs on a nationwide scale—at 
least $453 million in the first year and recurring annual costs of 
$34 million185—and would have involved a balancing of 
statistical human lives with those economic costs.186   
B. The Proposal
In this section, I argue that the Court should consider 
replacing the current intelligible principle approach to the 
nondelegation doctrine with an approach that declares delegations 
of authority to decide “major questions” unconstitutional.  
Scholars have argued a similar proposition.187  As to what 
180. See id. at 672, 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
181. Id. at 686.
182. Id. at 685-87.
183. Id. at 687-88.
184. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Reg. Grp. v.
EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)).  
185. See The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 628-29 (plurality opinion).  Notably, these are
pre-1980 figures, not adjusted for inflation. 
186. Id. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
187. See e.g., Cass, supra note 11, at 184, 188-93 (arguing that “the nature of the
power conferred, rather than the scope of the power, must be the linchpin for limiting 
delegations” and that “policy choices of major importance” cannot be delegated); Lawson, 
supra note 11, at 376-77 (arguing that “Congress must make the central, fundamental 
decisions, but Congress can leave ancillary matters to the President or the courts”).   
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constitutes a “major question” under the proposal, that is 
answered below in subsections (2) and (3).188   
1. Jurisprudential Support
While this Article does not examine the constitutional 
arguments for or against the nondelegation doctrine generally, a 
nondelegation doctrine that prohibits delegations of major 
questions finds plenty of support in the Supreme Court’s case law.  
First and foremost, the proposal is consistent with the Court’s 
earliest sentiments on the topic of delegation.  In Wayman v. 
Southard, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the Court, 
distinguished between “those important subjects, which must be 
entirely regulated by the legislature itself” and “those of less 
interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power 
given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill 
up the details.”189  Clearly Chief Justice Marshall believed that 
non-major and fill-up-the-details decisions could be delegated 
away to the other branches.190  Chief Justice Marshall admitted, 
however, that the line between major and non-major subjects “has 
not been exactly drawn.”191  Nevertheless, the power to decide the 
“important” subjects, if identifiable, is a “strictly and exclusively 
legislative [power]” that cannot be delegated.192 
Indeed, until the “intelligible principle” test transformed the 
Court’s analysis in the mid-20th century, the Court essentially 
employed a major questions approach based on the nature of the 
authority delegated rather than an approach that asked whether 
the delegation was specific enough.193  As Justice Gorsuch 
pointed out, the Court repeatedly upheld delegations either 
because they (1) only delegated the authority to “fill up the 
details” or (2) made the application of a pre-decided policy 
contingent on executive fact-finding.194  The Court in Panama 
Refining recognized these traditional tests and specifically noted 
188. See infra Part IV.B.ii-iii.
189. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
190. See id. at 43-44.
191. Id. at 43.
192. See id. at 42-43.
193. See Cass, supra note 11, at 161-64.
194. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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that, as long as Congress establishes the “primary” policy 
standards, those entrusted to execute the law may do what is 
necessary to carry out Congress’s policy, but no more.195 
Nondelegation of major questions is also consistent with the 
two cases in which the Supreme Court actually used the 
nondelegation doctrine to invalidate grants of authority.196  Both 
cases involved delegations of major questions, and neither relied 
on the intelligible principle test.197 
In Panama Refining, Congress granted to the President the 
power, in his sole discretion, to prohibit the interstate and foreign 
transportation of petroleum in excess of what state law allowed to 
be produced or removed from storage.198  Furthermore, any 
violation of whatever the President decided was punishable by 
fine, imprisonment, or both.199  Thus, any rule the President 
promulgated would have affected the entire petroleum industry 
by imposing serious constraints on its operation and commerce.200  
As the Court specifically concluded, the statute did not leave mere 
details to fill in, nor did it make a pre-determined policy decision 
contingent on executive fact-finding.201  Congress left this major 
policy decision up to the President, and the Court rightly declared 
it to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.202 
In Schechter Poultry, Congress granted to the President the 
authority to approve entire “codes of fair competition” for 
virtually any trade or industry upon application by their respective 
organizations.203  Other than provide that the President’s codes 
must not “promote monopolies” or oppress small businesses, the 
Act contained almost no limits to what the President could 
regulate.204  This gave even greater policymaking power to the 
President than the more specific provision in Panama Refining.205  
195. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 426 (1935).
196. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
198. Panama Ref., 293 U.S. at 406.
199. Id.
200. Cf. id. at 415.
201. See id. at 430 (concluding that the statutory provision went beyond the traditional
limits of delegation). 
202. See id.
203. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 522 (1935).
204. See id. at 538-39.
205. See id.
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There is no doubt this would be considered a delegation of power 
to decide many major questions.   
Enforcing a nondelegation doctrine that prohibits 
delegations of major questions ensures that Congress—the body 
most accountable to the people—makes the important policy 
decisions governing society.  While it has become largely 
accepted that interstitial matters may be delegated,206 Congress 
cannot escape its duty to make the hard policy decisions by 
passing that responsibility off to others.207  As demonstrated 
below, however, the test I propose is rather restrictive and would 
likely not satisfy many formalist proponents of the nondelegation 
doctrine.   
2. How Would the Test Work?
Probably the quickest and easiest way to attack this proposed 
version of the nondelegation doctrine is to write off the “major 
questions” threshold as an unworkable test.  However, for the 
sake of doctrinal simplicity, I would adopt essentially the same 
standard as the Supreme Court’s major questions doctrine, which 
has typically been expressed as whether the issue is one of major 
“economic and political significance.”208  Still, there are 
complications in implementing this standard in the nondelegation 
context.   
Notwithstanding, for a moment, the potential for arbitrary 
application because of the test’s broad language, how would 
courts analyze whether Congress delegated a major question?  
Would it be in light of the agency’s rule being challenged or by 
only looking to the statute itself?  Just because the agency’s rule 
is considered a major one under the major questions doctrine, 
does that conclusively establish that Congress improperly 
delegated a major question such that the statutory provision must 
be declared unconstitutional?   
206. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting). 
207. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448
U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
208. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015); Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573
U.S. 302, 324 (2014); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 147, 
160 (2000).   
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I believe the better rule would be to look only to the statute 
itself.  Remember, the major questions doctrine is still in the 
toolbox and perfectly capable of analyzing the rules themselves.  
Of course, if a statute violates the nondelegation doctrine, the 
agency’s rule would also be invalidated.  Therefore, the test 
should be whether the statute would cause the agency to decide a 
question of major economic and political significance no matter 
what the agency actually decided.  In the event that a statute does 
not violate the nondelegation doctrine under this test but the 
agency’s actual rule constitutes a major decision, the major 
questions doctrine is available.209  But to strike down a statute 
simply because an agency wrongly interpreted the statute and 
enlarged its authority unilaterally would frustrate Congress’s 
ability to enact legislation. 
3. “Major Economic and Political Significance” Factors
Getting back to the broad language of the test:  major 
economic and political significance.  Critics would argue the test 
could lead to arbitrary and political decisions by judges.210  It 
forces judges to engage in line-drawing by deciding what 
constitutes a question of major economic and political 
significance.211  But the current “intelligible principle” test fares 
no better:  it has proved to be an unworkable test that also engages 
in line-drawing and can lead to arbitrary results.212  Line-drawing 
may, therefore, be inevitable in nondelegation cases, but “the 
inherent difficulty of line-drawing is no excuse for not enforcing 
the Constitution.”213  And I believe that the major questions test 
209. However, this scenario would seem to contravene the main rationale behind the
major questions doctrine—that Congress does not implicitly delegate major questions.  
210. See e.g., Gordon, supra note 20, at 823.  Cf. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 154, at
45-48 (discussing, in the major questions doctrine context (but using “elephants-in-
mouseholes”), how major questions are often “in the eye of the beholder” and how the
Supreme Court Justices have been very unpredictable when applying the doctrine);
Moncrieff, supra note 155, at 612-13 (arguing that a “bare majorness rule” for the major
questions doctrine would be “error-prone because the majorness line is too difficult to
administer”).
211. See Sebring, supra note 134, at 242-43.
212. See, e.g., Moncrieff, supra note 155, at 619.
213. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. 43, 61 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring). 
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would come closer to enforcing the Constitution’s separation of 
powers than the intelligible principle test.  The solution to the 
line-drawing problem is to ensure that the test has as much 
guidance as possible.  Therefore, I would adopt a set of factors—
most of which have already been recognized by the Supreme 
Court in its major questions cases—along with a presumption 
against finding a major delegation. 
With all the factors, it is important under this proposal to 
divorce the statute’s language from the agency’s rule being 
challenged.  Just because an agency’s rule may be considered 
major by the factors doesn’t necessarily mean that Congress 
delegated a major question.  It might just mean that the agency 
wrongly interpreted and expanded the authority granted to it by 
Congress.  Again, the proposed test is whether the statute would 
cause the agency to decide a major question no matter what 
decision it reached.214  This is a serious limitation on the doctrine.  
Furthermore, I would impose a presumption against finding 
a major delegation since the test could prove to be arbitrary and 
unpredictable in the most difficult cases.  The presumption 
against finding a violation would provide predictability and 
would limit the doctrine’s application to only the clearest 
violations.215  It would also help to alleviate the legitimate 
concern that judges might invalidate congressional statutes based 
on their subjective determination that a particular issue is a major 
one.  Nevertheless, some combination of the following factors 
could overcome the presumption and thus determine that a 
delegated issue is one of major economic and political 
significance.   
214. Despite the fact that some delegations may present the binary choice of the
delegee to regulate or not regulate (similar to the delegation in Panama Refining), this should 
not preclude the nondelegation doctrine’s enforcement under this proposal.  Presumably, if 
an agency’s rule or regulation is being challenged, the delegee has chosen to regulate. 
Therefore, so long as Congress has delegated the authority to act, the nondelegation doctrine 
can be used to invalidate a statutory provision based on those potential positive actions.   
215. Cf. Sebring, supra note 134, at 225-26 (arguing for a similar presumption in the
context of the major “rules” doctrine). 
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a. Economic Impact
The inevitable economic impact of an agency’s 
interpretation or rule under the statute would be one of the most 
relevant factors.  Economic impact has been a significant factor 
in almost every major questions case.216  This usually involves the 
amount of costs imposed on the industries and private parties 
regulated.217  However, the Court in King took notice of the 
“billions of dollars in [government] spending each year.”218  
Admittedly, it may be quite difficult in many cases to discern the 
inevitable economic impact simply by looking to the statute’s 
language.  Therefore, it may be permissible for the Court to make 
reasonable inferences from the amount of economic impact 
caused by the agency’s actual rule when determining what the 
impact might be if another rule were issued.  And of course, if the 
agency’s actual rule does not cause a major economic impact, the 
statute itself cannot be faulted for purposes of this factor.   
b. Scope of Regulation
Often discussed in conjunction with economic impact, the 
Court has looked to the scope of regulation in its major questions 
cases.219  This factor looks to (1) whether the regulation affects 
an entire major industry, (2) the number of industries or people 
affected, and (3) whether the regulation applies on a nationwide 
scale.220  The larger the scope of the inevitable regulation, the 
more likely a major delegation exists.221 
c. Political Significance
Another factor that has played a role in many major 
questions cases is the amount of political engagement or 
controversy surrounding an issue.222  For example, in Gonzales v. 
216. See Richardson, supra note 102, at 382-83.
217. See Sohoni, supra note 127, at 1425-26.
218. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
219. See Sebring, supra note 134, at 215-16.
220. See id. at 216, 218-20.
221. See id. at 220.
222. See Richardson, supra note 102, at 383.
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Oregon, the Court noted “[t]he importance of the issue of 
physician-assisted suicide, which has been the subject of an 
‘earnest and profound debate’ across the country . . . .”223  This 
factor may be measured by the degree of public attention to the 
issue or the amount of political debate among politicians in 
Washington.224  However, this factor alone most assuredly should 
not be dispositive because of the risk that some judges may 
subjectively find a particular issue to be “major” or “important” 
when others would not.   
d. Conduct Regulating or Liberty Restrictive
The last factor under the proposal does not measure a 
question’s “majorness” per se.  Rather, it is a threshold factor that 
must be met for a violation of the nondelegation doctrine to exist:  
the statute must have granted the delegee the authority to adopt a 
rule of general applicability regulating conduct or restricting 
personal liberty.225  Furthermore, if a delegation grants the 
authority to restrict personal liberty or impose criminal penalties, 
the delegation’s “majorness” likely is bolstered when combined 
with other factors.226   
Article I’s vesting clause has been interpreted as prohibiting 
Congress from delegating away its “legislative power.”227  While 
scholars have argued over the precise meaning of “legislative 
power,” Alexander Hamilton described Congress’s power as the 
power to “prescribe[] the rules by which the duties and rights of 
every citizen are to be regulated.”228  In 1810, the Court described 
it as the power to “prescribe general rules for the government of 
society.”229  Therefore, at a minimum, Congress must have 
delegated the authority to adopt a rule of general applicability 
223. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997)). 
224. See Richardson, supra note 102, at 384; see also U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855
F.3d 381, 423-24 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc).
225. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
226. See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
227. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (plurality opinion).
228. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 575 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed.,
1864).  
229. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136.
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regulating conduct for there to be a violation of the nondelegation 
doctrine.  A strict formalist approach would declare all 
delegations of “legislative power” to violate the doctrine.230 
Under this proposal, however, the distinction is that the 
delegation of legislative power must also be “major” to violate 
the nondelegation doctrine.  While surely unsavory to the strict 
formalists (of which there are very few these days), this approach 
responds to the endless debate over the precise definition of 
“legislative power” and serves as a compromise between the 
formalists and those pragmatists who would argue that Congress 
is incapable of making many hard policy decisions itself.231 
In both Gundy and a former Tenth Circuit case, Justice 
Gorsuch stressed the idea that grants of authority to decide 
whether to restrict people’s personal liberty, and specifically 
whether to impose criminal penalties, are especially egregious.232  
For purposes of this proposal, Gorsuch would likely regard those 
questions that impose restrictions on personal liberty as major 
questions, or at least more major.233  This factor, however, will 
not be enough in itself.   
For example, in Gundy, the Attorney General’s authority to 
decide whether to impose SORNA’s registration requirements on 
pre-Act offenders would affect approximately half a million 
people in addition to imposing criminal penalties for those failing 
to meet the requirements.234  Therefore, the scope of regulation is 
somewhat significant, and the liberty-restricting nature of the 
delegation heightens its “majorness.”  This may or may not, 
however, be enough to overcome the presumption against finding 
230. See Sean P. Sullivan, Powers, But How Much Power? Game Theory and the
Nondelegation Principle, 104 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1245 (2018). 
231. Cf., e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“Congress simply
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”). 
232. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131, 2144-45, 2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672-73 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from 
the denial of rehearing en banc). 
233. See Nichols, 784 F.3d at 672-73 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (“It’s easy enough to see why a stricter rule would apply in the criminal 
arena.  The criminal conviction and sentence represent the ultimate intrusions on personal 
liberty and carry with them the stigma of the community’s collective condemnation . . . .”). 
234. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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a major delegation.  It would likely come down to whether the 
question has a large economic impact or political significance.235 
V. CONCLUSION
The recent surge in interest in reviving the nondelegation 
doctrine236 combined with the dissatisfaction of the intelligible 
principle approach comes at a time when the Court has 
strengthened and established its major questions doctrine.  It is 
for this reason that I propose a revision in the Court’s approach to 
the nondelegation doctrine.  The proposal is merely a starting 
point, however, and would undoubtedly need some refining.  I 
invite others to critique the proposal and point out its potential 
flaws.  But it seems that there comes a point when the separation 
of powers must be enforced.  That line, I believe, can easily be 
drawn by requiring (at a minimum) that Congress make the most 
important and significant decisions regulating society.   
235. As for economic impact, Justice Gorsuch mentioned in his dissent that applying
SORNA’s registration requirements to pre-Act offenders threatened to impose costly 
burdens on states.  Id. at 2132.  It may also have an economic impact in the sense that more 
taxpayer money would be used to imprison those pre-Act offenders who would violate 
SORNA’s requirements.  As for political significance, it’s hard to see how imposing 
penalties on sex-offenders is an especially controversial political issue.   
236. This Article was first written before Justice Ginsburg’s passing.  Now with Justice
Barrett and Justice Kavanaugh on the Court (Kavanaugh did not participate in the Gundy 
decision), there may be two extra votes to enforce the nondelegation doctrine.  However, it 
doesn’t appear that Justice Barrett ever decided a nondelegation case while on the Seventh 
Circuit.  She previously discussed, without arguing against, the Supreme Court’s lax 
enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine in an article regarding the specific issue of 
whether Congress may delegate to the President the decision to suspend the privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus during an emergency.  See Amy Coney Barrett, Suspension and 
Delegation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 317-19 (2014).  Justice Barrett’s general views of the 
doctrine are likely influenced by her mentor, Justice Scalia, who struggled in nondelegation 
cases to decide between two of his most closely held, but conflicting, tenets:  (1) the 
preference of deferring to Congress on matters of policy and thus avoiding judicial 
intervention into Congress’s decision to entrust others with discretion and (2) enforcing the 
Constitution’s express separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches.  
See generally William K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and 
Constitutional Argument, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107 (2017).   
